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Abstract— The Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) community in 
the United States has identified the need for a “collision 
avoidance region” in which UAS Detect-and-Avoid (DAA) 
vertical guidance is restricted to preclude interoperability issues 
with manned aircraft collision avoidance system vertical 
resolution advisories (RAs). This paper documents the process by 
which the collision avoidance region was defined. Three 
candidate definitions were evaluated on 1.3 million simulated 
pairwise encounters between UAS and manned aircraft covering 
a wide range of horizontal and vertical closure rates, angles, and 
miss distances. Each definition was evaluated with regard to UAS 
DAA interoperability with manned aircraft collision avoidance in 
terms of how well it achieved: 1) the primary objective of 
restricting DAA vertical guidance prior to RAs when the aircraft 
are close, and 2) the secondary objective of avoiding unnecessary 
restrictions of DAA vertical guidance at DAA alerts when the 
aircraft are further apart. The collision avoidance region 
definition that fully achieves the primary objective and best 
achieves the secondary objective was recommended to and 
accepted by the UAS community in the United States. By this 
definition, UAS and manned aircraft are in the collision 
avoidance region where DAA vertical guidance is restricted when 
the time to closest point of approach (CPA) is less than 50 
seconds and either the time to co-altitude is less than 50 seconds 
or the current vertical separation is less than 800 feet. 
Keywords- unmanned aircraft systems; interoperability; detect-
and-avoid; well clear; collision avoidance; resolution advisories 
NOMENCLATURE 
DMOD   distance modification 
HMD   horizontal miss distance (at CPA) 
*HMD   horizontal miss distance (at CPA) threshold 
ZTHR   vertical separation (at horizontal CPA) 
*ZTHR   vertical separation (at horizontal CPA)  
  threshold 
hd   current vertical separation 
*
hd   current vertical separation threshold 
xd   horizontal separation in x-dimension 
yd   horizontal separation in y-dimension 
r   slant range 
r   slant range rate 
xyr   horizontal range 
xyr   horizontal range rate 
CPAt   time to horizontal CPA 
rhv   relative vertical velocity 
rxv   relative horizontal velocity in x-dimension 
ryv   relative horizontal velocity in y-dimension 
mod   horizontal modified tau 
*
mod   horizontal modified tau threshold 
mod_ r   slant range modified tau 
v   vertical tau 
*
v   vertical tau threshold 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A consortium of industry, government, and academic 
institutions in the United States named RTCA Special 
Committee-228 (SC-228) has developed Minimum Operational 
Performance Standards (MOPS) for Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (UAS) [1]. The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) in the United States will utilize these MOPS to develop 
technical standards and regulations for Detect-And-Avoid 
(DAA) systems and other equipment necessary for UAS to 
meet federal aviation regulations including to remain “well 
clear” of other aircraft, some of which may be equipped with 
an onboard collision avoidance system: Traffic Alert and 
Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) in the United States and 
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) in Europe. 
In safety-critical situations such as loss of DAA well clear 
(LoWC) and near mid-air collision (NMAC) when UAS are in 
closest proximity with manned aircraft, interoperability 
between UAS DAA systems and manned aircraft collision 
avoidance (CA) systems is crucial. In particular, UAS DAA 
systems must not provide guidance that is incompatible with 
guidance known as Resolution Advisories (RAs) that manned 
aircraft may receive from onboard CA systems, which act as a 
last resort safety net. Otherwise, UAS may maneuver in a way 
which conflicts with manned aircraft collision avoidance RAs. 
The safety-critical topic of interoperability between UAS 
DAA systems and manned aircraft collision avoidance systems 
was first explored in-depth in an ATM2015 paper [2] in which 
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millions of encounters between UAS and manned aircraft were 
simulated and evaluated. The author found that when UAS 
guidance was not coordinated with manned aircraft TCAS 
RAs, UAS vertical rate changes greater than 500 feet per 
minute (ft/min) in close-proximity situations resulted in higher 
risk of NMAC. This study was the basis for the inclusion in the 
RTCA SC-228 preliminary draft MOPS [3] of a collision 
avoidance region within which UAS DAA vertical guidance is 
restricted to preclude interoperability issues with manned 
aircraft collision avoidance system vertical RAs. 
At the request of RTCA SC-228, NASA evaluated the 
definition of the CA region in the preliminary draft MOPS in 
terms of interoperability with manned aircraft collision 
avoidance system RAs (Section IV). NASA also developed and 
evaluated two alternative definitions for the CA region based 
on careful study of the definitions of TCAS II version 7.1 RAs 
(Section II.C) and DAA alerting (Section II.B) because 
differences between the CA region definitions and the TCAS II 
sensitivity level (SL) definitions for RAs could significantly 
affect the degree of interoperability between UAS DAA 
systems and manned aircraft collision avoidance systems [4]. 
The three CA region definition candidates were evaluated 
on 1.3 million simulated pairwise encounters between UAS 
and manned aircraft covering a wide range of horizontal and 
vertical closure rates, angles, and miss distances that could 
occur in the airspace, including rare “corner cases” (Section 
III). This paper documents the results of this research to 
recommend a CA region definition that was accepted by RTCA 
SC-228 for the final UAS DAA MOPS [1]. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. UAS Well-Clear Definition 
The second FAA-sponsored Sense-and-Avoid (SAA) 
Workshop defined SAA as “the capability of a UAS to remain 
well clear from, and avoid collisions with, other airborne 
traffic” [5]. The current study uses the term “detect and avoid” 
(DAA) instead of SAA because the UAS community in the 
United States transitioned to using DAA after the publication 
of the workshop report with no change in meaning. 
The UAS Executive Committee Science and Research 
Panel in the United States coordinated research efforts by 
NASA, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln 
Laboratory, and the United States Air Force Research 
Laboratory to develop a quantitative definition of well clear for 
UAS [6]. Several well clear definition candidates for UAS 
were evaluated by a variety of methods, including an approach 
based on the safety risk of the relative geometry between UAS 
and other aircraft [7]. Based on the results of these analyses, a 
well clear definition for UAS was recommended to RTCA SC-
228 and the FAA. After incorporating feedback from both 
institutions, a consensus in the United States on the definition 
of well clear for UAS was reached. By this definition, a loss of 
DAA well clear (LoWC)—which is different than the 
subjective loss of “well clear”—is an event in which a UAS is 
in close proximity with another aircraft such that the following 
three conditions are concurrently true [1]: 
 
1. * * where 450 fth h hd d d   
2. * * where 4000 ftHMD HMD HMD   
3. * *
mod mod mod0  where 35 sec and 4000 ftDMOD       
 
Figure 1 illustrates the variables and parameters used to 
define well clear for UAS, each of which will be described in 
detail in this section. The asterisked parameters are thresholds 
and the non-asterisked variables are measured or projected 
values. The dashed objects are projections of the aircraft. This 
schematic illustrates an encounter between a UAS flying level 
heading east and a manned aircraft flying level heading west. 
 
Figure 1.  Schematic of the types of variables and parameters used to define 
UAS well clear (side view, not drawn to scale, HMD not illustrated) 
 
The UAS well clear definition uses a spatial threshold in 
the vertical dimension known as *
hd  to which the current 
vertical separation is compared ( 2 1hd h h  ). 
The LoWC definition also utilizes a spatial metric in the 
horizontal dimension known as the horizontal miss distance 
(HMD), which is the projected separation in the horizontal 
dimension at the predicted close point of approach (CPA) using 
linear extrapolation in the horizontal dimension: 
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In the example illustrated in Figure 1 and described in the 
paragraph above it, HMD is the cross-track distance between 
the UAS and the manned aircraft because the former is flying 
due east while the latter is flying due west. 
The UAS well clear definition also uses a temporal 
separation metric known as “modified tau” (
mod ) that 
estimates the time to CPA between two aircraft. Modified tau 
is adopted from the collision detection logic of TCAS II (also 
simply called “TCAS” throughout the rest of this paper) [8]. 
Modified tau is based on the concept of “tau” ( ), which is 
calculated as the ratio of slant range ( r ) between two aircraft 
to their slant range rate ( r ) and measured in seconds (sec): 
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As described in the TCAS II Manual [9], one issue with the 
tau metric is that the calculated tau can be large even when the 
physical separation between two aircraft is small if the rate of 
closure is low (e.g., two aircraft flying at about the same speed, 
on the same heading, and offset by a small distance). In 
situations like this, the calculated tau value does not assure 
adequate separation because a sudden trajectory change that 
increases the closure rate (e.g., a turn) may cause LoWC. To 
provide protection for these types of situations, a modified 
alerting threshold referred to as “modified tau” was developed 
for use in TCAS II. Modified tau utilizes a parameter known as 
“distance modification” (DMOD) to provide a minimum threat 
range boundary encircling the ownship aircraft. 
In TCAS II, modified tau (
mod_ r ) is calculated using slant 
range ( r ) and slant range rate ( r ). By comparison, during the 
second FAA-sponsored SAA Workshop [5], it was decided that 
modified tau (
mod ) in the UAS DAA well clear definition be 
calculated based on horizontal range (
xyr ) and horizontal range 
rate (
xyr ) and measured in seconds as follows: 
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B. DAA Warning Definition 
The DAA Warning alert definition in this study uses the 
same types of parameters and has the same form as the UAS 
well clear definition. A buffer of about 0.09 nautical miles 
(nmi) was added to the UAS well clear DMOD and HMD* 
thresholds of 4000 ft to model what a DAA system might use 
to guard against the effects of uncertainty. The modified tau 
and current vertical separation thresholds of 35 sec and 450 ft, 
respectively, are the same as in the UAS well clear definition. 
In the simulations conducted for this study, DAA Warning 
alerts were issued when the following set of conditions was 
predicted to occur within 40 seconds, which is the sum of the 
25-second minimum average time of alert for the Hazard Zone 
of DAA Warning alerts [1] and a 15-second buffer that a DAA 
system might use to guard against the effects of uncertainty: 
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C. TCAS 
This study utilized TCAS II version 7.1 software tailored 
with a convenient interface to integrate into different testing 
platforms. It computes Proximate Traffic messages, traffic 
advisories (TAs), and resolution advisories (RAs). This study 
focuses specifically on TCAS RAs, especially with regard to 
when they are issued relative to when the CA region is crossed, 
if ever. The spatial and temporal thresholds used by TCAS II 
are listed in Table I. (See [9] for additional details.) 
TABLE I.  TCAS II VERSION 7.1 SENSITIVITY LEVEL (SL) DEFINITIONS 
AND THRESHOLDS FOR RESOLUTION ADVISORIES 
Manned Aircraft 
Altitude (ft) 
SL 
Tau 
(sec) 
DMOD 
(nmi) 
ZTHR 
(ft) 
ALIM 
(ft) 
< 1000 (AGL) 2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
1000-2350 (AGL) 3 15 0.20 600 300 
2350-5000 4 20 0.35 600 300 
5000-10000 5 25 0.55 600 350 
10000-20000 6 30 0.80 600 400 
20000-42000 7 35 1.10 700 600 
> 42000 7 35 1.10 800 700 
 
The tau thresholds listed in Table I are for both modified 
tau and vertical tau ( v ). The latter is defined as: 
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D. Collision Avoidance Region Definition Candidates 
UAS are projected to interact with manned aircraft on a 
regular basis [10], [11], [12]. In fact, the latter study estimated 
that UAS and manned VFR aircraft could experience LoWC 
separation at an unacceptable rate of about once every 50 UAS 
flight hours in the absence of mitigations such as those 
provided by UAS DAA systems. 
In safety-critical situations like LoWC and near mid-air 
collision (NMAC) when UAS are in close proximity with 
manned aircraft, interoperability between UAS DAA systems 
and manned aircraft collision avoidance systems is essential as 
shown in [2]. This study was the basis for the inclusion in the 
RTCA SC-228 preliminary draft MOPS [3] of a Collision 
Avoidance (CA) Region within which UAS DAA vertical 
guidance is restricted if the UAS does not have Vertical RA 
Complement (VRC) data (e.g., “do not climb”) from the 
manned aircraft’s collision avoidance system. To prevent the 
UAS from maneuvering to maintain or regain DAA well clear 
in a way that could be incompatible with the manned aircraft’s 
collision avoidance maneuver in this situation, UAS DAA 
guidance is restricted in two ways: 1) no vertical altitude 
guidance is provided, and 2) no vertical speed guidance beyond 
the current vertical speed ± 500 ft/min is provided. 
The collision avoidance region must be sufficiently large to 
encompass all geometries that would trigger a TCAS RA (i.e., 
the TCAS RA region). That is, UAS and manned aircraft must 
always enter the CA region prior to any TCAS RAs issued by 
manned aircraft onboard collision avoidance systems in line 
with the interoperability principles described in [4] and [13]. 
However, the CA region also should not be so large as to limit 
DAA vertical guidance unnecessarily at DAA Warning alerts 
when aircraft are further apart. 
Three CA region definition candidates were evaluated in 
this paper. The “AND” collision avoidance region definition in 
the preliminary RTCA SC-228 draft MOPS [3] was developed 
based on research presented at ATM2015 [2]. In addition, two 
alternative definitions (“OR” and “OR-h”) were developed in 
this study based on careful study of the definitions of TCAS 
RA (Section II.C) and DAA alerting (Section II.B). All three 
CA region definition candidates were evaluated in terms of 
how well they achieved the competing dual interoperability 
objectives described in the prior paragraph. 
 
1. The “AND” definition of the collision avoidance region 
has a form like the DAA alerting definition (Section II.B) 
that connects all conditions by “AND” operators. It does 
not fully encompass the TCAS RA region, though, since 
the two vertical conditions are connected by an “AND” 
operator instead of an “OR” operator (verified by TCAS II 
experts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-
Lincoln Laboratory and the MITRE Corporation in the 
United States): 
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RTCA SC-147 chose the threshold values based on the 
highest TCAS II RA sensitivity level (i.e., bottom row of Table 
I). The tau values in the “AND” collision avoidance region 
definition include 15 seconds for pilot response and TCAS II 
altitude tracker response [3]. 
 
2. The “OR” definition connects the two vertical conditions 
by an “OR” operator instead of an “AND” operator in 
order to fully encompass the TCAS RA region: 
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3. The “OR-h” definition also fully encompasses the TCAS 
RA region like the “OR” definition. They differ in that the 
“OR-h” definition uses a “current vertical separation” (
hd ) 
condition as in the DAA alerting definition instead of a 
“vertical separation at CPA” (ZTHR) condition: 
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III. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
A. Encounter Set 
The three collision avoidance region definition candidates 
were evaluated on 1.3 million pairwise encounters between 
UAS and manned aircraft simulated using NASA’s Java 
Architecture for DAA Extensibility and Modeling [14] that 
cover all combinations of the parameters in Table II. This 
encounter set is appropriate for this study on interoperability 
between UAS DAA systems and manned aircraft collision 
avoidance systems because it encompasses a wide range of 
horizontal and vertical closure rates, angles, and miss distances 
that could occur in the airspace. The combinatorial approach 
was utilized because it naturally captures the rare “corner 
cases” that may not occur on a regular basis in the airspace. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
TABLE II.  TEST PARAMETERS FOR UAS AND MANNED AIRCRAFT 
Parameter 
# 
Values 
Values 
UAS ground speed 4 50, 100, 150, 200 kts 
UAS heading 1 0 deg 
UAS vertical speed 1 0 ft/min 
Manned ground speed 5 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 kts 
Manned heading 12 
0, 30, 60, 90, 120, 150, 180, 210, 240, 
270, 300, 330 deg 
Manned vertical speed 9 
-2000, -1500, -1000, -500, 0, 500, 1000, 
1500, 2000 ft/min 
Horizontal manned 
CPA distance 
9 
0 nmi: (x, y) = (0, 0) 
0.5 nmi: (x, y) = (0.5, 0), (-0.5, 0), (0, 
0.5), (0, -0.5) 
1.5 nmi: (x, y) = (1.5, 0), (-1.5, 0), (0, 
1.5), (0, -1.5) 
Vertical manned CPA 
distance 
7 -1000, -500, -250, 0, 250, 500, 1000 ft 
UAS trial plan 
maneuver turn rate 
2 1.5, 3 deg/sec 
UAS trial plan (climb, 
descent) rate 
5 
(500, 500), (1000, 1000), (2000, 2000), 
(2000, 1000), (1000, 2000) ft/min 
 
In each encounter, the UAS was simulated flying level at 
altitude 5000 ft heading north. The UAS ground speeds ranged 
between 50 and 200 kts to cover the expected performance 
range of UAS aircraft. To span the range of possible encounter 
situations, manned aircraft flying level as well as manned 
aircraft descending and manned aircraft climbing at vertical 
speeds up to 2000 ft/min were simulated (Figure 2). The 
manned aircraft were simulated flying at speeds between 50 
and 250 kts in encounters at a wide range of angles relative to 
the UAS from the front, rear, and sides (Figure 3). Encounters 
were simulated with CPA distances from 0 nmi horizontally 
and 0 ft vertically up through 1.5 nmi horizontally and 1000 ft 
vertically (Figure 4 and Figure 5). Lastly, guidance information 
for the UAS aircraft using different trial plan turn rates and 
climb and descent rates was also collected. 
 
Figure 2.  Schematic of representative simulated encounters with manned 
aircraft intruders: 1) flying level toward the UAS, 2) descending toward the 
UAS, and 3) climbing toward the UAS 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Schematic of representative simulated encounters with manned 
aircraft intruders converging toward the UAS: 1) from the front, 2) from the 
rear, 3) from the left, and 4) from the right 
 
Figure 4.  Schematic of encounters with vertical offset (gray) and without 
vertical offset (black) 
 
Figure 5.  Schematic of encounters with horizontal offset (gray) and without 
horizontal offset (black) 
B. Simulation Features 
All encounters were simulated without uncertainty and 
without mitigations performed by either UAS or manned 
aircraft to ensure that the sequences of DAA Warning alerts, 
collision avoidance region crossings, and TCAS RAs were 
entirely determined by encounter geometries. This is suitable 
for identifying and resolving the major interoperability issues 
between UAS DAA systems and manned aircraft collision 
avoidance systems. However, higher-fidelity simulations with 
realistic surveillance, sensor, and tracker models, DAA 
  
 
  
 
mitigations (as in [15]), and/or collision avoidance mitigations 
are needed to investigate any remaining interoperability issues 
and research other aspects of DAA systems (e.g., alerting). 
C. Interoperability Metrics 
This study evaluates the three collision avoidance region 
definition candidates in terms of their interoperability with 
TCAS RAs and DAA Warning alerts. More specifically, this 
study analyzes when collision avoidance region thresholds are 
crossed (if ever) relative to when TCAS RAs and DAA 
Warning alerts are issued (if ever). The interoperability of the 
collision avoidance region with TCAS RAs is the most 
important consideration because this is when UAS and manned 
aircraft are in closest proximity and safety is most critical. 
1) Interoperability between the Collision Avoidance 
Region and TCAS Resolution Advisories 
It is essential that vertical guidance provided by the UAS 
DAA system be restricted to prevent conflicts with TCAS RAs 
issued by the manned aircraft’s TCAS system. To do this, the 
CA region threshold must always be crossed before a TCAS 
RA is issued. There should not be any encounters in which a 
TCAS RA is issued before the CA region threshold is crossed, 
and there also should not be any cases in which a TCAS RA is 
issued but the CA region threshold is never crossed. CA region 
definition candidates that allow these undesirable situations to 
occur are unacceptable. 
The corresponding metrics to evaluate collision avoidance 
region definition candidates are: 
 
1. Out of the encounters in which a TCAS RA is issued, the 
percentage with a TCAS RA issued before the CA region 
is crossed 
2. Out of the encounters in which a TCAS RA is issued, the 
percentage without the CA region ever being crossed 
 
Figure 6.  Illustration of event sequences analyzed for interoperability 
between the CA region and TCAS RAs 
 
The denominator for both of these metrics is the number of 
encounters in which TCAS RA is issued: 343,100. This was the 
same for each CA region definition candidate because all 
simulated encounters were unmitigated (i.e., no maneuvers). 
2) Interoperability between the Collision Avoidance 
Region and DAA Warning Alerts 
As a secondary objective, the CA region should not be so 
large as to limit DAA vertical guidance unnecessarily at DAA 
Warning alerts. Ideally, there would not be any cases in which 
the CA region is crossed before a DAA Warning alert is issued. 
In addition, a DAA Warning alert ideally would always be 
issued before the CA region is crossed. However, since UAS 
and manned aircraft have greater separation at the time that 
DAA Warning alerts are issued than at the time that TCAS 
RAs are issued, the corresponding metrics do not necessarily 
have to be 0% and 100%, respectively: 
 
1. Out of the encounters in which the CA region is crossed, 
the percentage with the CA region crossed before a DAA 
Warning alert is issued 
2. Out of the encounters in which a DAA Warning alert is 
issued, the percentage with a DAA Warning alert issued 
before the CA region is crossed 
 
Figure 7.  Illustration of event sequences analyzed for interoperability 
between the CA region and DAA Warning alerts 
 
These two metrics are used to decide between CA region 
definition candidates that do not allow either of the undesirable 
interoperability situations between the CA region and TCAS 
RAs (Figure 6) to occur. 
The denominator for the first of these metrics is the number 
of encounters in which the CA region is crossed, which varies 
by CA region definition candidate. This number was 829,380 
for the “AND” definition, 1,113,180 for the “OR” definition, 
and 1,194,080 for the “OR-h” definition. On the other hand, the 
denominator for the second of these metrics is the number of 
encounters with a DAA Warning alert, which was the same for 
each CA region definition candidate because all simulated 
encounters were unmitigated (i.e., no maneuvers): 719,280. 
3) Summary 
Table III summarizes the set of undesirable and desirable 
interoperability situations analyzed in this paper. The first two 
rows are the undesirable interoperability situations illustrated in 
Figure 6 that correspond to the primary interoperability 
objective for the CA region to be large enough to encompass 
all geometries that lead to TCAS RA on the manned aircraft 
(*). The other rows of Table III correspond to the competing 
secondary interoperability objective illustrated in Figure 7 for 
the CA region to not be so large as to limit DAA vertical 
guidance unnecessarily at DAA Warning alert (**). 
  
 
TABLE III.  TYPES OF INTEROPERABILITY SITUATIONS ANALYZED 
Type Description 
Undesirable 
TCAS RA issued, then CA region crossed* 
TCAS RA issued without CA region crossed* 
CA region crossed, then DAA Warning alert issued** 
Desirable DAA Warning alert issued, then CA region crossed** 
 
IV. RESULTS 
The first two interoperability metrics in Table III are the 
most important for evaluating the three collision avoidance 
region definitions (Section IV.A): 1) the percentage of 
encounters with a TCAS RA in which the CA region was 
crossed after a TCAS RA was issued, and 2) the percentage of 
encounters with a TCAS RA in which the CA region was never 
crossed. These metrics capture the most safety-critical 
situations when the UAS and manned aircraft were in closest 
proximity such that the vertical guidance provided by the UAS 
DAA system must not conflict with RAs issued by the manned 
aircraft’s TCAS system. Any CA region definition for which 
one or both of these metrics are greater than zero is not 
suitable. After excluding all unsuitable CA region definition 
candidates, the remaining ones are evaluated (Section IV.B) in 
terms of having the lowest value for the last undesirable metric 
in Table III and the highest value overall for the desirable 
metric in Table III. 
A. Results Invalidating the “AND” Collision Avoidance 
Region Definition 
Table IV shows the prevalence of encounter situations with 
undesirable events for each CA region definition candidate. 
The most important difference between them is that the “AND” 
definition is the only one with the highly undesirable cases in 
which a TCAS RA was issued before the CA region was 
crossed or a TCAS RA was issued without the CA region ever 
being crossed (first two rows of the “AND” column in Table 
IV). Based on these results, the “AND” CA region definition 
certainly should not be used in DAA systems since it does not 
encompass all geometries that trigger TCAS RAs. The “AND” 
definition could allow for UAS DAA vertical guidance that is 
incompatible with manned aircraft TCAS RAs. By comparison, 
these undesirable cases never occurred when using the “OR” 
CA region definition or the “OR-h” CA region definition (the 
0% values in Table IV). 
TABLE IV.  UNDESIRABLE SITUATIONS (LOWER PERCENTAGE IS 
PREFERRED) 
Undesirable Situation “AND” “OR” “OR-h” 
TCAS RA issued, then CA region crossed 6.2% 0% 0% 
TCAS RA issued without CA region 
crossed 
16.5% 0% 0% 
CA region crossed, then DAA Warning 
Alert issued 
0.1% 23.8% 3.2% 
 
Since the results in this section indicate that the “AND” 
collision avoidance region definition is unsuitable for DAA 
systems, Section IV.B will only compare the performance of 
the “OR” and “OR-h” CA region definitions. The one with the 
highest overall interoperability with manned aircraft TCAS 
RAs and UAS DAA Warning alerts was recommended to 
RTCA SC-228. However, before delving into that analysis, the 
two most frequent types of encounter geometries which 
disqualified the “AND” CA region definition from contention 
are illustrated and discussed next. 
 
1) Investigation of the most prevalent encounter geometry 
in which a TCAS RA was issued before the CA region was 
crossed 
One type of encounter geometry was most prevalent among 
the cases in which a TCAS RA was issued on the manned 
aircraft before the “AND” CA region was crossed. In this 
situation, the two aircraft were separated vertically between 
420 ft and 600 ft, which was close enough to trigger a TCAS 
RA on the manned aircraft. However, since the manned aircraft 
was converging vertically toward the UAS at a slow rate of 500 
ft/min, UAS DAA vertical guidance was not restricted when 
using the “AND” definition of the CA region because the 
vertical tau exceeded the 50-second maximum threshold. 
Figure 8 illustrates one representative example in which 
vertical tau was 71 sec because the manned aircraft was 592 ft 
above the UAS and descending toward the UAS at a rate of 
500 ft/min. The two aircraft were sufficiently close both 
spatially and temporally to trigger a TCAS RA on the manned 
aircraft. However, the “AND” CA region was not crossed 
because the vertical tau of 71 sec was greater than the 50-
second maximum threshold. On the other hand, the “OR” and 
“OR-h” CA regions were crossed in this zero horizontal 
separation case. With regard to the former, the modified tau of 
0 sec was less than its maximum threshold of 50 sec and the 
vertical separation at CPA of 0 ft was less than its maximum 
threshold of 800 ft. With regard to the latter, the modified tau 
of 0 sec was less than its maximum threshold of 50 sec and the 
current vertical separation of 592 ft was less than its maximum 
threshold of 800 ft. 
 
Figure 8.  Schematic of representative slow vertical closure case with a 
TCAS RA issued before the “AND” CA region was crossed because vertical 
tau exceeded the maximum threshold of 50 seconds 
 
  
 
  
 
2) Investigation of the most prevalent encounter geometry 
in which a TCAS RA was issued without the CA region ever 
being crossed 
One type of encounter geometry was most prevalent among 
the cases in which a TCAS RA was issued without the “AND” 
CA region ever being crossed. In this situation, the UAS and 
the manned aircraft were both flying level and separated 
vertically by less than 600 ft, which was close enough for the 
manned aircraft’s TCAS system to issue an RA. However, 
since the vertical closure rate was zero, vertical tau was 
undefined and, thus, the “AND” CA region was never crossed. 
Figure 9 illustrates one representative example in which 
vertical tau was undefined because the UAS and the manned 
aircraft were both flying level at altitude 5000 ft with vertical 
rate of 0 ft/min. The two aircraft were close enough both 
spatially and temporally to trigger a TCAS RA on the manned 
aircraft, but the “AND” CA region was never crossed because 
vertical tau was undefined since the vertical closure rate was 
zero. On the other hand, both the “OR” and the “OR-h” CA 
regions were crossed because the vertical separation at CPA of 
0 ft (“OR”) and the current vertical separation of 0 ft (“OR-h”) 
were both less than their respective 800-ft maximum thresholds 
in addition to the modified tau of 2.4 sec being less than their 
50-sec maximum thresholds. 
 
Figure 9.  Schematic of representative zero vertical closure case with a TCAS 
RA issued before the “AND” CA region was crossed because vertical tau was 
undefined 
B. Results Supporting the “OR-h” Collision Avoidance 
Region Definition 
This section compares the results for the “OR” and “OR-h” 
CA region definitions in terms of their interoperability with 
UAS DAA Warning alerts. The first result discussed is the 
prevalence of encounters in which the CA region was crossed 
before a DAA Warning alert was issued. In these undesirable 
situations, the CA region was overly large and DAA vertical 
guidance for the UAS would have been restricted unnecessarily 
at DAA Warning alerts even though the UAS and manned 
aircraft were outside of the safety-critical TCAS RA region. As 
seen in the bottom row of Table IV in Section IV.A, this metric 
is more than 20 percentage points lower for the “OR-h” 
definition than for the “OR” definition. This result supports 
using the “OR-h” CA region definition for UAS DAA systems 
because it had a lower degree of non-interoperability with 
DAA Warning alerts. 
One type of encounter geometry was most prevalent among 
the cases in which the “OR-h” CA region was not crossed prior 
to a DAA Warning alert, but the “OR” CA region was crossed 
prior to a DAA Warning alert. In this situation, the “OR-h” CA 
region was not crossed even though modified tau was less than 
50 sec because the UAS and manned aircraft were vertically 
separated by at least 800 ft and the rate of vertical convergence 
was slow enough that vertical tau was greater than 50 sec. 
However, the “OR” CA region was crossed because the 
vertical convergence rate was fast enough that the predicted 
vertical separation at horizontal CPA was less than 800 ft. 
Figure 10 illustrates one representative example in which 
the “OR” CA region was crossed because the modified tau of 
49.5 sec and the predicted vertical separation at horizontal CPA 
of 0 ft were both less than their respective maximum thresholds 
of 50 sec and 800 ft. There was no DAA Warning alert at this 
time instance since the vertical separation between the two 
aircraft was predicted to be more than 450 ft for the entire 
DAA alerting 40-second look-ahead time horizon. DAA 
Warning alerts were issued later on as the aircraft converged. 
The “OR-h” CA region was not crossed at this time because 
the vertical tau of 61 sec and the current vertical separation of 
2033 ft both exceeded their respective maximum thresholds of 
50 sec and 800 ft. 
 
Figure 10.  Schematic of representative case in which the “OR” CA region 
was crossed before a DAA Warning alert, but the “OR-h” CA region was not 
crossed before a DAA Warning alert 
The next analysis in this section is the prevalence of 
encounters with the desirable situation of the CA region being 
crossed after a DAA Warning alert was issued. In these cases, 
the CA region was not so large that DAA vertical guidance for 
the UAS would have been restricted unnecessarily at DAA 
Warning alerts. 
Although the results for all three CA region definitions are 
included in Table V for completeness, only the results for the 
“OR” and “OR-h” definitions are compared because the results 
in Table IV of Section IV.A already disqualified the “AND” 
definition from contention. As seen in Table V, the metric is 
more than 30 percentage points higher when using the “OR-h” 
definition than when using the “OR” definition. This result 
supports using the “OR-h” CA region definition for UAS DAA 
systems because it had a higher degree of interoperability with 
DAA Warning alerts. 
TABLE V.  DESIRABLE SITUATION (HIGHER PERCENTAGE IS PREFERRED) 
Number “AND” “OR” “OR-h” 
DAA Warning Alert issued, then CA 
region crossed 
78.9% 63.2% 94.7% 
 
C. Summary 
Three CA region definition candidates were evaluated on 
1.3 million simulated pairwise encounters between UAS and 
manned aircraft for a wide range of vertical and horizontal 
closure rates, angles, and miss distances. The “AND” CA 
region definition was determined to be unsuitable since it did 
not encompass all encounter geometries that triggered TCAS 
RAs—primarily those with slow (e.g., 500 ft/min) or zero 
vertical closure rates. The “AND” CA region definition could 
allow for UAS DAA vertical guidance that is incompatible 
with manned aircraft TCAS RAs, which is unacceptable. 
Between the “OR” and “OR-h” CA region definitions, the 
other interoperability metrics indicated that the latter had a 
lower degree of non-interoperability and a higher degree of 
interoperability with DAA Warning alerts. Based on the results 
of this study, the “OR-h” collision avoidance region definition 
was recommended to RTCA SC-228 at its July 2016 meeting 
and accepted for use in the MOPS for UAS DAA systems [1]. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. State-Based Collision Avoidance Region Parameters 
The data analysis results in Section IV indicate that the 
“OR-h” definition of the collision avoidance region has the 
lowest degree of non-interoperability and the highest degree of 
interoperability with regard to TCAS II Resolution Advisories 
and DAA Warning alerts. However, it may be possible to 
improve the interoperability of the “OR-h” CA region 
definition by making its threshold values state-based as in 
TCAS II instead of using constant values in all situations. 
A set of altitude-based vertical separation threshold values 
for the “OR-h” CA region definition is proposed in this section 
for follow-up research. The primary constraint is that each 
threshold value must be at least as large as its TCAS II RA 
counterpart to ensure safety. Using state-based threshold values 
for other conditions and parameters such as modified tau, 
vertical tau, and DMOD could also improve the 
interoperability of the “OR-h” CA region definition with 
manned aircraft TCAS RAs and DAA Warning alerts. 
The “OR-h” definition of the CA region utilizes a constant 
vertical separation threshold value of 800 ft in all situations. 
This led to undesirable cases in which the UAS and the 
manned aircraft crossed into the “OR-h” CA region prior to 
DAA Warning alert, such as when they were horizontally 
converging with modified tau less than 50 sec, vertically 
separated by at least 450 ft but less than 800 ft, and vertically 
diverging. In this case, they were in the “OR-h” CA region. 
However, there was no DAA Warning alert because its current 
vertical separation condition was never satisfied. Using the 
smaller, altitude-based TCAS II vertical separation threshold 
values in Table VI in the current vertical separation condition 
of the “OR-h” CA region definition could prevent a subset of 
these undesirable situations from occurring. 
TABLE VI.  VERTICAL SEPARATION THRESHOLD PARAMETERS 
Manned Aircraft 
Altitude (ft) 
TCAS 
SL 
TCAS 
Value  
“OR-h” 
Value 
Proposed 
Value 
< 1000 (AGL) 2 N/A 800 600 
1000-2350 (AGL) 3 600 800 600 
2350-5000 4 600 800 600 
5000-10000 5 600 800 600 
10000-20000 6 600 800 600 
20000-42000 7 700 800 700 
> 42000 7 800 800 800 
 
B. Suitability of Suppressing Vertical Guidance for Non-
Cooperative Manned Aircraft 
This study investigated a method of suppressing UAS DAA 
vertical guidance to ensure interoperability with the collision 
avoidance systems of cooperative (i.e., transponder-equipped) 
manned aircraft. RTCA SC-228 also identified that it may be 
necessary at times to suppress UAS DAA vertical guidance in 
encounters with non-cooperative manned aircraft, which do not 
have an onboard collision avoidance system by definition. In 
this scenario, the UAS can only utilize its radar system to track 
and estimate the state and projected path of non-cooperative 
manned aircraft. This can lead to significant errors, particularly 
when estimating vertical speed. This is especially problematic 
when determining how to regain DAA well clear separation 
since a poor maneuver choice could potentially result in mid-
air collision between the UAS and the non-cooperative manned 
aircraft. Research is necessary to determine the circumstances 
under which suppressing DAA vertical guidance is necessary 
as well as the situations in which allowing DAA vertical 
guidance is beneficial (e.g., when the UAS is capable of 
maneuvering vertically at a faster rate than the propagation of 
its radar errors). 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
DAA systems enable UAS to remain well clear of other 
aircraft, some of which are manned aircraft equipped with a 
collision avoidance system. In the United States, private 
industry, government, and academia worked together in RTCA 
SC-228 to develop MOPS for UAS DAA systems. A safety-
critical aspect of this work was ensuring that UAS DAA 
systems never provide guidance that is incompatible with 
manned aircraft collision avoidance RAs. As part of this effort, 
this paper investigated three candidate definitions for a spatial-
temporal “collision avoidance region” in which UAS DAA 
vertical guidance is restricted to preclude interoperability issues 
with manned aircraft collision avoidance RAs. 
Three collision avoidance region definitions were evaluated 
on 1.3 million simulated pairwise encounters between UAS 
and manned aircraft that spanned a wide range of horizontal 
and vertical closure rates, angles, and miss distances which 
could occur. One definition was disqualified because it was not 
large enough to prevent incompatible UAS DAA vertical 
guidance from ever being provided in safety-critical situations 
in which manned aircraft TCAS II systems issued vertical RAs. 
The two most prevalent types of encounter geometries in these 
cases involved either slow (e.g., -500 ft/min) or zero vertical 
closure rates between the UAS and manned aircraft. 
Of the remaining two CA region definition candidates, the 
one with both the lowest degree of non-interoperability and the 
highest degree of interoperability with DAA alerts was 
recommended to RTCA SC-228. By this definition, two 
aircraft are in the collision avoidance region and UAS DAA 
vertical guidance is restricted when the time to closest point of 
approach (modified tau) is less than 50 seconds and either the 
time to co-altitude (vertical tau) is less than 50 seconds or the 
current vertical separation is less than 800 feet. TCAS II 
experts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology-Lincoln 
Laboratory and the MITRE Corporation in the United States 
reviewed the research findings and concurred with the 
recommendation. RTCA SC-228 accepted the recommended 
collision avoidance region definition for use in its MOPS for 
UAS DAA systems to ensure interoperability between UAS 
detect-and-avoid and manned aircraft collision avoidance. 
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